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Abstract
This report documents a probabilistic risk assessment of an existing power sup-
ply system at a large telecommunications office. The focus is on characterizing the
increase in the reliability of power supply through the use of two alternative power
configurations. Telecommunications has been identified by the Department of Home-
land Security as a critical infrastructure to the United States. Failures in the power
systems supporting major telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor
to major telecommunications outages. A logical approach to improve the robustness
of telecommunication facilities would be to increase the depth and breadth of tech-
nologies available to restore power in the face of power outages. Distributed energy
resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could provide one more onsite electric
power source to provide backup power, if batteries and diesel generators fail. The
analysis is based on a hierarchical Bayesian approach and focuses on the failure prob-
ability associated with each of three possible facility configurations, along with assess-
ment of the uncertainty or confidence level in the probability of failure. A risk-based
characterization of final best configuration is presented.
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Executive Summary
Telecommunications has been identified by the Department of Homeland Security as a
critical infrastructure to the United States. Failures in the power systems supporting major
telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor to major telecommunications out-
ages, as documented by analyses of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) outage
reports by the National Reliability Steering Committee (under auspices of the Alliance for
Telecommunications Industry Solutions). There are two major issues that are having in-
creasing impact on the sensitivity of the power distribution to telecommunication facilities:
deregulation of the power industry, and changing weather patterns.
A logical approach to improve the robustness of telecommunication facilities would be
to increase the depth and breadth of technologies available to restore power in the face of
power outages. Distributed energy resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could pro-
vide one more onsite electric power source to provide backup power, if batteries and diesel
generators fail. But does the diversity in power sources actually increase the reliability of
offered power to the office equipment, or does the complexity of installing and managing
the extended power system induce more potential faults and higher failure rates?
The goal of this effort is to perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) on an ex-
isting power configuration for a large telecommunications office (a Sprint Mega-Site with
battery backup, and diesel generator backup) and for two alternative power configurations
involving gas turbines as a primary power source. The analysis focuses on the failure prob-
ability associated with each of the three facility configurations, along with some assessment
of the uncertainty or confidence level in the failure probability estimate. Aging effects are
not included in the analysis. Failure probability estimates will provide a necessary com-
ponent to service availability estimates from the alternative configurations, but availability
estimates per se will not be part of the study.
Due to the importance of time and the operational dependencies between power system
elements, the analysis approach taken involved modeling the supply of power to the facility
as a stochastic process. The time to failure for each of the elements necessary to provide
power were modeled as a random variable with an associated probability distribution func-
tion. Due to the limited availability of data, the parameters of the distributions were further
assumed to be random variables. This approach provided a basis for conducting a risk-
based comparison of the alternative power configurations.
The system analyzed in the report involved a telecommunications facility consisting of
two switch-bays and a satellite reception system. Power is supplied through a 12470 V
public utility line. In the event of the loss of power from the utility, there are three diesel
generators available and sufficient fuel to operate each of the generators for 72 hours. At
least two of the three generators are needed to provide the minimum level of power. In the
event that generator power is lost, a backup system of lead-acid batteries can be used to
provide a minimum level of power for up to 4 hours.
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For this analysis, a worse case scenario was assumed; typical of that encountered in the
event of a severe weather event. If utility power was lost, it was assumed that restoration
of power could not be achieved before all segments of the backup power were system were
exhausted. Similarly, if a diesel generator or gas turbine failed, minor repair was possible,
but replacement of the entire generator (or turbine) was not an option. The only available
fuel for the generators was that currently stored on-site (assumed to be 72 hours worth
for each generator); fuel lost through consumption or contamination could not be replaced
within the 4 hours of power assumed to be available from the backup batteries.
Three scenarios were investigated. The first scenario to be investigated was the current
configuration, referred to as the Base Case. As discussed above, this consisted of utility
power, with backup diesel generators and a bank of batteries. Two alternative power system
were also investigated; both of these involved the use of turbines fueled by natural gas.
The first configuration consisted of an array of 24 60kW Capstone microturbines. All
24 turbines were under constant load and a minimum combination of 18 turbines were
required to provide the minimum level of power for the facility. The second configuration
involved the use of a single Kawasaki 1.5 mW turbine as the primary power source. For
both turbine configurations, the reliability of the natural gas supply was included in the
reliability characterization.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the analyses. Comparing the median time to failure
(TTF) for each configuration, it is easy to see that the use of the single Kawasaki turbine
was by far the most promising alternative with a 76-fold increase in the expected operation
time. The array of Capstone microturbines also showed promise with more than a 6-fold
increase in power supply reliability.
Table 1. Analysis Summary
Time to Failure 10.00% median 90.00%
Capstone TTF TFC 2698 4960 8706
Kawasaki TTF TFK 7969 59010 249100
Base Case Total Tbase 178.8 776.9 2531
A risk-based perspective provided even more support for the conclusions and permitted
accounting for the uncertainty in the available failure information. Consider a comparison
between the reliability of the current power supply (i.e. Base Case) and the array configura-
tion of Capstone microturbines suggested by Sprint. There is a 90% chance that the utility
power will fail before 2531 hours, while there is a 90% chance that the Capstone array will
provide power for at least 2698 hours. Finally, consider that there is a 90% probability that
the Capstone array will fail to provide power for less than approximately 8706 hours, while
there is a 90% probability that the single Kawasaki turbine will provide power for at least
7969 hours.
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It should be noted that a significant element in the lower reliability estimate for the Cap-
stone was the configuration and operational plan suggested by Sprint. Other configurations
could have quite different reliability characteristics and may warrant further investigation.
However, there are installation issues associated with the Capstone, e.g. special enclosure,
that could be a factor in the final decision also.
In conclusion, given the operational scenario assumed and given the uncertainties in the
three alternatives, the suggested choice is the use of the Kawasaki 1.5 mW turbine as the
primary power source for the Sprint telecommunication facility.
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Impact of Distributed Energy
Resources on the Reliability of a
Critical Telecommunications Facility
1 Background
Telecommunications has been identified by the Department of Homeland Security as a
critical infrastructure to the United States. Failures in the power systems supporting major
telecommunications service nodes are a main contributor to major telecommunications out-
ages, as documented by analyses of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) outage
reports by the National Reliability Steering Committee (under auspices of the Alliance for
Telecommunications Industry Solutions). There are two major issues that are having in-
creasing impact on the sensitivity of the power distribution to telecommunication facilities:
deregulation of the power industry and changing weather patterns.
In 1995-96 Sandia National Laboratories initiated a study of the impact of deregulation
on the reliability of the bulk power network [28, 27, 28]. The initial study was based on
the ERCOT power grid and was extended to examine the impact of deregulation on the
reliability of the Western States Coordinating Council (WSCC) bulk power network. The
conclusions of both of these studies highlighted two issues: lack of reserve generation and
insufficient/poorly located transmission capacity. The conclusion of the investigation was
that, unless a national regulatory body interceded, the result of restructuring would be a
national bulk power system that was more sensitive to external disturbance.
A major factor on both the operation of the network and the consumer consumption
will be the growing uncertainty in weather events [11, 12, 21, 31]. One of the most
widely recognized experts in understanding the impact of weather is Sir John Houghton. In
Houghton’s book [13], he notes that the recent changes are not part of a short term trend,
but are part of a much longer, sustained change. Houghton summarizes weather changes
over the 21st century and suggests that, among other significant climate phenomena, it is
expected that there will be:
• more intense precipitation events
• increased summer temperatures (leading to higher cooling demands)
• increase in tropical cyclone peak wind intensities, accompanied by increased mean
and peak precipitation intensities,
• increased intensity of mid-latitude storms leading to increased infrastructure losses
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All of these will have first or second order impacts on the telecommunications and power
infrastructures. There is no incentive for the power utilities to make their systems more
robust to these disturbances; rather, the industry has moved to change the reliability report-
ing requirements to avoid financial penalties [30]. As noted by Sandia researchers in 2000,
telecommunication companies, emergency services, etc. dependent on a reliability source
of power need to be prepared for increased uncertainty in the operation of the national
electrical infrastructure [16].
1.1 Robust Telecommunications Infrastructure
One approach toward improving the robustness of the power systems supporting telecom-
munications offices is to improve the reliability of the necessary supply of power. Current
best practices involve a combination of onsite battery backup (for short, intermittent power
interruptions) and diesel generators (for longer term interruptions). Occasionally, universal
power systems (UPS) technologies are also used for specific data communications equip-
ment backup.
A logical approach to improve reliability would be to increase the depth and breadth
of technologies available to restore power in the face of power outages. Distributed en-
ergy resources such as fuel cells and gas turbines could provide one more onsite electric
power source to provide backup power, if batteries and diesel generators fail. But does the
diversity in power sources actually increase the reliability of offered power to the office
equipment, or does the complexity of installing and managing the extended power system
induce more potential faults and higher failure rates?
The goal of this effort is to perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) on an ex-
isting power configuration for a large telecommunications office (a Sprint Mega-Site with
battery backup, and diesel generator backup) and for two alternative power configurations
adding gas microturbines as a primary power source. The product from the study will be
a failure probability associated with each of the three facility configurations, along with
some assessment of the uncertainty or confidence level in the failure probability estimate.
Aging effects will not be included in the analysis. Failure probability estimates will provide
a necessary component to service availability estimates from the alternative configurations,
but availability estimates per se will not be part of the study.
2 Introduction
Distributed energy resources technology is a growing focus of research across the energy
industry and within the Department of Energy. For example, Sandia National Laboratories
has established the Distributed Energy Technologies Laboratory (DETL) to assist in the de-
velopment and implementation of distributed energy resources. DETL tests microturbine,
engine-generator, photovoltaic, fuel cell, and energy-storage technologies both individually
12
and in a collective microgrid. Collaborators include manufacturers, utilities, the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), DOE, DoD, the California Energy Commission,
universities, standards organizations, and other national and private laboratories. Energy
security is one of several important benefits that distributed energy resources will offer to
the nations electric power infrastructure.
Natural gas turbines, or microturbines, derivatives of aircraft auxiliary power systems,
are one DER technology for cogeneration with particular appeal. Turbines are highly effi-
cient with fuel conversion efficiency on the order of 40% and have a number of fuel options
including biofuels, ethanol and natural gas. These turbines are designed for continuous op-
eration, generally operating at 90% of their rated value. Emissions are necessarily low to
meet the local environmental pollution requirements (e.g. California NOx limit of 2.5 ppm,
6 ppm of CO corrected to 15% exhaust oxygen).
Two gas turbine alternatives are investigated in the following sections. The first configu-
ration is based on a generation package composed of 4 pallets of 6 Capstone microturbines.
The second configuration is based on a single Kawasaki turbine. Both are co-located with a
remote telecommunication facility and operate off an external supply of natural gas. In both
cases, the primary source of power is co-generation production with the utility subsuming a
role as a backup source of power in the event of turbine system failure. The existing diesel
generators (in conjunction with the facility battery system) would then be employed if both
the turbines and utility power become unavailable.
However, the objective of this effort is to investigate the impact of distributed energy
resources (DER) on the reliability of the power supplied to the telecommunications center.
The following section outlines the operational scenario assumed with this study and the
analysis approach. Following this is a discussion of the fundamental issue driving this
analysis: the uncertainty associated with the ability of the local utility to supply power to
the telecommunications center. The current facility configuration, referred to as the Base
Case, is then characterized.
3 Operational Scenario
Sandia was requested to analyze the impact of distributed energy resources on the reliability
of a telecommunication center, assuming that the time to repair was not a factor. This
analysis constraint, effectively assumes that the facility is isolated from major logistics
support, and operation is restricted to the physical equipment currently available for a given
configuration. Such a situation might result, for example, from a severe weather incident.
The location of interest is the Sprint Orlando wireline switch facility. This facility is
remote - access is via approximately 7 miles of unpaved roads. The utility power at this
particular location is particularly unreliable requiring an unusual reliance on standby power
at the facility. In the most recent four year period there were 35 utility outages (compared
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with a national average of approximately 3 outages per year for 2001 and 2002) [23, 24,
26, 25]
For this analysis, an (almost) worse case scenario is assumed. If utility power is lost,
restoration of power will not occur within a time period that will have a significant impact.
(The impact of this assumption is investigated early in the report.) Similarly, if a diesel
generator or gas turbine fails, minor repair is possible, but replacement of the entire gener-
ator (or turbine) is not an option. The only available fuel for the generators is that currently
stored on-site (assumed to be 72 hours worth for each generator); fuel lost through con-
sumption or contamination cannot be replaced within 4 hours. The time of 4 hours is used
since the batteries are required to provide a minimum level of support for the plants for an
additional 4 hours in the event that power is lost from the generators.
4 Analysis Approach
The focus of this effort is to characterize the impact of distributed energy resources (DER)
on the reliability of a major telecommunication center. Sandia was initially asked to focus
on the application of fault trees for characterizing the reliability impact and a typical fault
tree developed to support the analysis is depicted in Figure 1. The remaining fault trees are
presented in Appendix A.
The telecommunication center consists of a main facility supported by two switch bays
(MSB-1 and MSB-2) and the Earth Station. Power is supplied to the facility primarily
through a traditional utility drop. In the event that utility power is lost, at least two of the
on-location 1.5MW diesel generators must function. In addition to the two generators, the
battery system must be available to provide minimal support for an addditional 4 hours in
the event that the generators fail.
However, for the DER configurations to be explored in this effort, the majority of the
elements in MSB-1, MSB-2 and the Earth Station would be consistent fixtures. In addi-
tion, the fuses, breakers, and other components which lend complexity to the analysis have
demonstrated extremely high reliability over many years of field operation and would not
have a significant impact on the reliability assessment. For this reason, it was decided to
simplify the fault trees and a typical simplified fault tree is presented in Figure 2. However,
the need to consider repair was raised as a possible area for investigation. For this reason it
was decided not to explore the use of fault trees to support the analysis.
Two alternative analysis approaches were then considered: Markov Chains and stochas-
tic processes. The initial review of the data suggested a great deal of variability in possible
parameter estimates. In addition, there was the increasing likelihood of wide variation in
the scenarios and equipment configurations to be investigated. For these reasons, it was
finally decided to employ a stochastic process approach based in Bayesian statistics (to
account for uncertainty in parameter values).
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The stochastic process approach allows the analysis to be broken down into a series
of potentially dependent events. The parameters characterizing the length of each of the
events will be assumed to be random variables with uncertainty about the parameters of the
probability density functions.
5 Event Characterization
5.1 Basic Approach
The standard methods and data used to estimate the reliability of power systems are docu-
mented in the IEEE Std 493-1997 IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable
Industrial and Commercial Power Systems [2]. A traditional approach is not applied be-
cause of the sequential, time-dependent nature of how the system is operated. Analysis
methods associated with Markov Chains were investigated and showed promise as an alter-
native that allowed inclusion of repair. However, Markov Chains rely on a strong historical
basis for estimating failure and repair rates.
As noted previously, the lack of an extensive database suggests addressing uncertainty
in parameter values, e.g. the failure rate of natural gas pipelines. The approach used in
this analysis assumes that the rate at which failure occurs or the time required for repair
will be random variables; that is, the time to failure distribution will actually be a family
of distributions. As more information and/or experience is gained, then the family of dis-
tributions collapses to a single distribution and more traditional methods, such as Markov
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Chains, can be employed. Specifically, if there was conflict or confusion regarding the final
decision, these advanced methods would provide insight into areas where funding spent on
additional data would be of greatest return.
For illustration of the approach, consider the supply of utility power. There are two el-
ements to the analyses of power availability: rate at which failures occur and, for the utility
power, the time required to restore service. Failure events will be assumed to occur after
periods of time Ti has passed. The length of time will be considered a random variable and
the choice of the underlying distribution will be a function of the system element being ana-
lyzed. For example, since there is not sufficient information to support a more complicated
characterization of the utility failure rates, the times will be assumed to be exponentially
distributed random variables: Ti ∼ exp[−λit], where λi represents the rate at which fail-
ures occur. Similarly, the length of time to recover from an outage, will be considered a
random variable characterized with an exponential distribution: Tj ∼ exp[−µ jt], where µ j
represents the rate at which repairs occur. (Note that the assumption of the exponential
distribution is also consistent with the reliability approach outlined in IEEE Std 493-197.)
Since there is significant variability in the failure (and repair) rates from year-to-year,
the failure rate for the outage time will also be considered a random variable. The prob-
ability distribution function describing the uncertainty in the utility failure rate, λ will be
assumed to be a gamma distribution:
g(λ|α,θ) = θ
α
Γ(α)
λα−1 exp[−θλ], λ,α,θ> 0.
5.2 Stochastic Process
Figure 3 depicts a typical sequence of events. Each event logically follows at the conclusion
of the previous event. For example, for the Base Case, the time that the utility is available
TU is randomly selected from f (T |λU)= exp[−λU t]. Since the rate at which the utility fails,
λU , is not known with certainty, a random parameter is chosen from the distribution Λ ∼
g(λ|α,θ). Because of the conditional structure of the the distributions for T and λ, Gibbs
sampling must be used. The WinBugs computer software was used for all simulations
conducted in this report [29] and the computer codes for each system configuration are
provided in the Appendices.
Similar to the utility reliability, values for diesel generator operation reliability, TG,
and battery reliability, TB are simulated. The values are then combined to get the time
until system failure, Tbase = TU +TG+TB. Figure 3 depicts the typical time line of events
associated with what is referred to in the following discussion as the Base Case.
The following sections address each of the elements of the various scenarios. The Base
Case is a function of the availability of power from the utility, the backup diesel generators,
and the batteries. The additional alternatives explored include the addition of natural gas
microturbines from Capstone and Kawasaki.
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Figure 3. Base Case Time Line of Events
The primary reliability impact of DERs will be related to their use to augment or replace
utility power as the primary power source. The utility (or DER) is then coupled with
combinations of diesel generators and the battery backup systems within the facility. The
current backup power for MSB-1 and MSB-2 is provided through three 1.5 mW stationary
diesel generators and the option of two mobile 1.5 mW generators. The Earth Station has
a separate backup power source consisting of two 300 kW generators.
The Base Case (depicted in Figure 3) is defined as the configuration of the telecom-
munication center as it exists today - without support of additional distributed energy re-
sources. The telecommunication center consists of a main facility supported by two switch
bays (MSB-1 and MSB-2) and the Earth Station. Power is supplied to the facility primarily
through a traditional utility drop. In the event that utility power is lost, at least two of the
on-location diesel generators must function. In addition to the two generators, the battery
system must be available to provide minimal support for an addditional 4 hours in the event
that the generators fail.
The current analysis is based on the peak power requirement for MSB-1 and MSB-2
of approximately 1.1mW (total) and 65kW for the Earth Station. These requirements may
expand as the demand on the system grows; additional fixed and mobile generators can be
added to the Base Case to increase the backup power capacity.
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The one-line diagrams for the Base Case are presented in Figures 4, 5 and 6. (For
reference, the original fault trees for each of the three major elements are provided in
Appendix A.)
6.1 Utility Availablility
To be consistent with the literature, the terms utility availability and utility reliability will
be used synonomously. The reliability of the utility power source will be defined as the
probability that, at any point in time, the telecommunication center is supplied with suffi-
cient power from the local utility. For this study this probability is effectively the fraction
of time that utility power is available at the telecommunications center.
Power utility reliability is typically characterized using a number of indices proscribed
the IEEEGuide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indicies (IEEE Std 1366-2003 [1]);
however, not all states have adopted standards as a means of characterizing utility power
reliability. For example, the state of Florida has requirements for reporting reliability met-
rics, but no quality of service incentives or penalties and the state of New Mexico has no
power reliability requirements [6]. In addition, weather is recognized by the utilities as a
major influence in estimating these indices and, in most cases, power disruptions related to
severe weather are discounted in the calculations. For example, major events are not nec-
essarily included in reliability indices where a major event might be defined as an outage
where more than 10% of the customers within a region are without electricity and power is
not restored within a 24 hour period [30].
The following discussion summarizes the major reliability measures used by public
power utilies. An interruption is considered countable if the time duration of the interrup-
tion exceeds 5 minutes. All indices defined below are for sustained interruptions. Let NT
be the total number of customers served, and Ni be the number of interrupted customers for
each sustained interruption.
System average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) The system average interruption
frequency index indicates how often the average customer experiences a sustained
interruption.
SAIFI =
Total Number of Customers Interrupted
Number of Customers Served
=∑i
Ni
NT
=
CI
NT
System average interruption duration index (SAIDI) This index indicates the total du-
ration of interruption for the average customer. It is commonly measured in customer
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minutes or customer hours of interruption. Let ri be the restoration time for each in-
terruption event:
SAIDI =
Total Number of Customer Interruptions
Number of Customers Served
=∑i
riNi
NT
=
CMI
NT
Customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) CAIDI represents the average
time required to restore service.
CAIDI =
Total of Customer Interruption Duration
Total Number of Customers Interrupted
=∑i
riNi
∑iNi
=
SAIDI
SAIFI
Lbar The overall average length of the outages
Lbar =
Minutes of Interruption
Total Number of Outages
Note that the CAIDI index can be deceptively low since customers may be counted
multiple times; once for each interruption. An alternative measure that is not generally
reported by utilities is the Customer total average interruption duration index (CTAIDI),
which counts customers with multiple interruptions only once (N∗i ):
CTAIDI =
Total of Customer Interruption Duration
Total Number of Customers Interrupted (*)
=∑i
riNi
∑iN∗i
Service availability is given by:
ASAI =
Total Customer Hours of Service
Total Customers Hours Demand
=
(8760)NT −∑i riNi
(8760)NT
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6.1.1 Florida Public Service Commission Data
The state of Florida, while not having Quality of Service requirements, does require each
utility to submit a formal report documenting the reliability metrics for the previous year [8].
Data is adjusted to account for severe storm events; it is believed, but not conclusively clear,
that Florida requires the utilities to use the IEEE Std 1366 [1] definitions to adjust the met-
rics for major events. Table 2 summarizes the 2005 report for the data obtained in 2004
and Figure 7 depicts the data graphically. Note that some of the utilities reported an ap-
proximate 20% improvement in 2004 numbers over those from 2003 after one of the most
notable hurricane seasons on record (Figure 8).
Table 2. Summary of Utility Recovery Time Related Metrics
Utility Reliability Metrics
SAIDI CAIDI LBAR SAIFI
PEF 77 64.7 111.9 1.19
FPL 73.9 59.4 181 1.24
FPUC 138.06 107.47 77.35 1.26
GULF 93.33 105.93 129.55 0.88
TECO 72.63 75.26 178.07 0.97
Average 90.98 82.55 135.57 1.11
Std Dev 27.60 22.78 44.32 0.17
6.1.2 Sprint Data
In the four years, 2001-2004, Sprint noted 35 incidents where power to the switching sta-
tion was disrupted [25] for a failure rate estimate of 8.75 events/year. In addition, Sprint
collected data on the length of diesel generator operation during these same outages. This
may be a consideration since the utility may not demonstrate stability immediately follow-
ing an outage; the facilities continue to use the already functioning diesel generators during
this additional period.
• Data are not available for the specific incidents, but similar Sprint telecommunication
facilities have experienced power outages with an average outage time of µoutage =
6.45 hours, and a standard deviation of σoutage = 6.54 hours [22]. To appreciate the
uncertainty in outage length, the shortest duration was an instantaneous outage, while
the longest outage lasted approximately 27 hours.
• The generators during these incidents were in-use for lengths of time with the fol-
lowing mean and standard deviation: µGenrun = 9.41 hours, σGenrun = 8.14 hours.
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6.1.3 IEEE Std 493-1997
As noted previously, the standard methods and data used to estimate the reliability of power
systems is documented in the IEEE Std 493-1997 [2]. While an industry standard, the
source of much of the data relevant to this effort are from surveys taken prior to 1976.
Reference [2], Table 3-33, suggests using an average outage duration of 125 minutes (2.08
hours).
For utility supplies to industrial plants where the voltage line is ≤ 15kV the suggested
failures per year (again from Table 3-33 [2]) is 3.621. (Note that when verifiable opera-
tional/field information is not available, data from this standard will be used in the analysis.)
6.1.4 Loss of Off-site Power (LOSP)
A second, very reliable source of utility data is available from each of the 103 nuclear power
plants across the US. It is well recognized that the availability of power to commercial
nuclear power plants is essential for safe operations and accident recovery. A loss of offsite
power (LOSP) event is therefore considered an important contributor to total risk at nuclear
power plants [3].
However, caution must be used when using data from nuclear plants related to utility
availability since utilities will do everything possible to assure delivery of power to the
nuclear plant; both for safety reasons and since nuclear power plants provide a significant
base power load. For example, the two major electrical disturbances on July 2, 1996 and
August 10, 1996 that blacked-out most of the western US, did not results in LOSP events. In
addition, for similar reasons, restoration times for nuclear plants can be substantially shorter
than for industrial loads. Finally, since reactors will often be shutdown in anticipation of a
grid or weather related disturbance, the rate at which off-site power is lost is not applicable
to the current analysis. Highlights of the published data [3]:
• Recovery time for grid-related events ranged from 125 to 360 minutes with a mean
of 190.2 minutes and a standard deviation of 97.4 minutes
• The time to recover from weather related incidents ranged from 37 minutes to 5.5
days, with a mean of 1258 minutes and a 90% probability interval of [23, 5009]
using a log-normal probability density function.
6.1.5 Utility Data Input Summary
Figures 9 and 10 summarize the data available for restoration time and failure rate. The data
from the utilities reported to the Florida Public Service Commission likely discounts severe
events of any type, e.g. weather, and is therefore optimistic. While not clear, the estimates
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from the IEEE Std 493 most likely have similar liabilities. The values developed for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reported to support LOSP estimates lean toward the
optimistic side since reactors are shutdown in anticipation of severe events.
For the remainder of the analyses, the mean restoration and failure rate data from Sprint
will be used to support the utility availability analyses since this data appears to be the most
realistic and applicable to the problem being investigated.
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6.2 Probability Distribution for Utility Reliability
It is assumed that the length of time that a utility is up and operating, TU , is an exponen-
tially distributed random variable with parameter λ: f (t|λ) = exp[−λt]. The parameter λ
represents the number of utility interruptions per year. However, the estimate λˆ = 8.75
represents a simple average rate at which events occurred over the four years; in reality,
there will be a great deal of variation or uncertainty about the rate, λ at which events might
occur each year.
Therefore, let λ be a random variable with an average value of 8.75. Without addi-
tional information regarding how the rate varies each year, the assumption of a Gamma
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distribution for λ is the simplest assumption that can be made:
f (λ|α,β) = 1
βαΓ(α)
λα−1 exp
(
−λ
β
)
,λ> 0
A distribution for λ and the mean of that distribution are now available. To completely
describe the Gamma distribution, one more assumption is necessary to characterize the
second parameter of the distribution. Assume that we are confident that the rate at which
events occur lies in the range [2, 14] events/year. This range will typically reflect [µ−
3σ,µ+3σ]. Solving, we find that a standard deviation of σ= 2.0 is a good place to start.
The mean and variance for the Gamma distribution are given by E[λ] = αβ = 8.75,
and V [λ] = αβ2 = 4, respectively. Simultaneously solving the two equations for the two
unknowns yields values of: α= 19.1406 failures/year and β= 0.457143.
The resulting probability density function (PDF) describing the uncertainty in the num-
ber of utility outages each year is presented in Figure 11. As noted previously, assume
that the length of time that a utility is up and operating, TU , is an exponentially distributed
random variable with parameter λ: f (t|λ) = exp[−λt]; since the failure rate, λ is a random
variable, the PDF f (t|λ) will inherently have an associated probabilistic uncertainty.
Figure 12 depicts this uncertainty as a probability band about the utility time to failure,
TU : there is a 90% probability that the power will be continuously available for more than
1126 hours, a 50% chance that it will be available for less than 106 hours, and a 90%
probability that power will be available for less than 2484 hours.
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6.3 Distribution for Generator Reliability
Failure of a diesel generator is defined as a malfunction of the generator or associated
support subsystems that prevents the generator from starting and running when a demand
has occurred. Failures can occur in two modes:
Failure to start (FTS) A failure of the generator to either manually or automatically start
on a bus under-voltage condition, reach rated voltage and speed, close the output
breaker, or sequence safety-related electrical loads onto the respective safety-related
bus.
Failure to run (FTR) A failure of the generator to continue to supply power to its respec-
tive safety-related electrical bus given the generator successfully started.
Using IEEE Std 493 [2], engineers at Sprint estimated a mean time to failure (MTTF) for
diesel generators of 9056 hours with a mean time to repair of 3.9 hours [25]. However,
the expected failure rate (λ= 1/MTTF) for diesel generators used in nuclear power plants
(NPPs) is approximately 0.0223 failures/hour. In addition, for diesel generators at nuclear
power plants the Pr{failure to start} = 0.0241 per demand [9, 10].
As with the utility analysis, the reliability of the generators will be assumed to be a
random variable described by the distribution:
R(t|λ) = exp(−λt)
The required operating period for the generators is t = 72 hours at which time the fuel at
the facility is expended; refueling is assumed to not be possible.
Given the wide disparity in the reliability data for the diesel generators, assume that the
time to failure for the generators is a random variable. The failure rate for the NPP diesel
generators: λ = 0.00223 is based on considerable data for a variety of diesel generators
from across the nuclear power plant industry. However, based on operational experience,
Sprint has also published an estimate of λ= 0.00011 failures/hours for the generators.
Given the strong historical basis, λ = 0.00223 will be used as the expected time to
failure and it will be assumed that the λ= 0.00011 is a lower 5% credibility limit (i.e. 95%
probability that the true MTTF is less than 9056 hours). A gamma distribution will be used
to describe the variation in the generator failure rate:
f (λ|α,β) = 1
βαΓ(α)
λα−1 exp
(
−λ
β
)
,λ> 0
The mean and variance are given by E[λ] = αβ, V [λ] = αβ2, respectively. Simultaneously
solving these two equations:
E[λ] = αβ
F(λ< 0.00011|α,β) = 1
βαΓ(α)
Z 0.00011
0
λα−1 exp
(
−λ
β
)
≈0.05
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for the two unknowns yields values of: α = 0.0001115 failures/hours or α = 0.976741
failures per year and β = 20. (Units of years are used in the remainder of the analysis
for consistency.) Given these parameters, the expected number of diesel generator failures
per year is approximately 19.54. The resulting probability density function describing the
uncertainty in the rate at which failures occur is presented in Figure 13. The results are
presented for a single generator; recall that at least two of the three generators must func-
tion. Also, the point estimates initially provided by Sprint and the US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission are noted.
6.3.1 Failure to Start
Define p to be the probability that a generator will not start on demand. Let p be a beta
distributed random variable conditioned on the variables r, s:
f (p|r,s) = 1
B(r,s)
pr−1(1− p)s−1,r,s> 0
where B(r,s) is the incomplete Beta function. The mean and variance of p are given,
respectively, by:
E[p] =
r
r+ s
V [p] =
rs
(r+ s)2(r+ s+1)
Given the NRC experience, let the mean be E[p] = 0.0241 and the standard deviation be√
V [p] = 2 ∗E[p]. This results in a prior distribution that is relatively uniform over the
area of interest so that the prior does not overly influence the results. Figure 14 depicts the
resulting prior distribution.
Typically, the maximum allowed load on each generator is 60% of the rated value,
therefore at least two of the generators are necessary for minimum support of the power
required by the two plants. In the event that only two generators are operational, air con-
ditioning (A/C) and other support functions would be cycled on/off to keep the plants fully
operational. Figure 15 depicts the time to failure distribution of the diesel generators con-
sidering that 2 of 3 must be functioning and that each generator has a certain probability of
not starting when called. The sharp rise at 72 hours is due to the limited source of on-site
fuel.
6.4 Battery Reliability
Battery backup consists of a bank of valve-regulated lead-acid (VRLA) batteries. VRLA
batteries are a well established technology [4] used as a backup power source for short
33
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periods of time. Common batteries used in the telecommunications site include C&D [15]
and East Penn [7]. The batteries are assumed to be in three groups of strings: Earth Station
(16 strings), MSB-1 (28 strings), MSB-2 (16 strings). In particular, Plant 1 has an 8,000
amp shunt and has 16 strings of C&D HD-1300, Plant 2 has a 10,000 amp shunt and has
28 strings of C&D HD-1300, and Plant 3 has a 15,000 amp shunt and has 8 strings of C&D
HD-1300 and 8 strings of East Penn AVR95-33.
Cantor et al [5] describes the performance characteristics of VRLA batteries by exam-
ining the capacity for the cells in its survey of VRLA batteries. Their definition of failure
as used in their tables is that a cell did not meet a specific battery capacity level (e.g. 80%,
60%, or 50% capacity). Typically, the 80% capacity-level is used by manufacturers to de-
termine a failed battery for the purposes of warranty protection. In communications with
Sprint to determine the sizing of the batteries used at their Orlando site, it is assumed that
Sprint uses the 80% capacity-level in order to size their batteries to meet a 3-hour backup
power protection. If the batteries have not degraded and have closer to 100% capacity, it
would be expected that the backup power might last up to 4 hours.
Per IEEE Std 1188 [14], the percent capacity of a VRLA battery at 25◦C (77◦F):
Pc=
ta
ts
×100 (1)
where ta is the actual time of the test to specified voltage level as corrected for temperature
and ts is the rated time to specified terminal voltage.
Per IEEE Standard 1188, it is assumed that although the Cantor paper lists a cell as
failed, the battery cell is still providing some residual capacity. In particular, in Cantor [5]
for VRLA batteries still in their useful life only 2% of the cells (332 out of 13733) failed to
maintain a 50% capacity-level, 4% failed to maintain a 60% capacity-level, and 13% failed
to maintain an 80% capacity-level. Assuming that this is an appropriate mixture of ages
that are seen in the real world and normalizing the results: 5% of the cells would have failed
to maintain a 50% capacity-level, 8% would have failed to maintain a 60% capacity-level,
and 22% would have failed to maintain an 80% capacity-level.
Since the degradation of capacity is dependent on the use temperature, cycling, charging
characteristics, etc., it is assumed that cells in a facility experience the same degradation of
capacities over their lifetimes. In particular, consider the East Penn AVR95-33 (a complete
48V string comprised of 2 stacks being 6 modules high where each module has 2 cells and
all 24 cells housed in the same cabinet), it is expected that all of the cells in the strings
would have the same performance characteristics over their lifetimes.
From a reliability perspective, the multiple string arrangements at the Orlando site are
assumed to take on a skewed probability density function curve as depicted in Figure 16.
Given IEEE Standard 1188 and that Sprint uses 80% capacity for sizing a 3 hour backup
time, the assumed capacities can be translated into the times to failure that would rea-
sonably apply at the Orlando site. For 16-string: 2% chance of not working at all , 5%
chance of discharging ≤ 2 hours , 25% chance of discharging ≤ 3 hours , 100% chance of
discharging < 4 hours.
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Figure 16. Battery Reliability
For 28-string: 3% chance of not working at all (increased chance over the 16-string),
8% chance of discharging ≤ 2 hours, 40% chance of discharging ≤ 3 hours, 100% chance
of discharging < 4 hours. Considering this distribution of discharge times, the final proba-
bility of failure of the supply of battery power to the facility is given in Figure 17.
6.5 Base Case Summary
Table 3 summarizes the results for the Base Case configuration; recall that this represents a
summary of the reliability characteristics of the current configuration at the Sprint telecom-
munications facility under the operational scenario assumed. Figure 18 depicts the results
graphically.
Table 3. Base Case Time to Failure Summary
Time to Failure µ σ 10.00% median 90.00%
Base Case Total Tbase = TU +TG+TB 1130 1119 178.8 776.9 2531
Utility Time to Failure - TU 1058 1120 107 706.2 2457
Generator Failure to Start 0.02414 0.04833 2.03E-06 0.00343 0.07514
Diesel Generator - TG 69.57 10.04 72 72 72
Battery (time) - TB 2.625 0.9331 1.294 2.869 3.53
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7 Base Case Considering Utility Repair
In this section, the possibility of repair of the utility power is explored. The analysis quan-
tifies the power availability and provides a basis for comparison of the analysis results
associated with the Base Case with the experience of Sprint engineers.
Let TR be the time that it takes for the utility to restore power after an outage. If the time
to restore utility power is more than the time that power is available through a combination
of diesel generators and batteries, than the facility is without power for a period of time:
P{facility down}=P{TR < TG + TB} (see Figure 19). If Tbase is the time that power is
available for the Base Case (no utility repair), then Tdelta = TU +TR−Tbase. The P{facility
down}= P{Tdelta < 0}.
TU
0
TG
TB
Tbase=TU+TG+TB
Utility w/ Repair
2/3
TR
Tdelta
Figure 19. Time Line with Utility Repair (Tdelta)
7.1 Utility Down-time
Aswith the reliability characterization, it will again be assumed that the length of time that a
utility power is not available is also an exponentially distributed random variable. Based on
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data from Sprint the average outage time of µoutage = 6.45 hours, and a standard deviation
of σoutage = 6.54 hours [22]. By definition, λ= 1/µ so E[λ] = 0.155 and V [λ] = 0.0234.
As before, assume that the rate λ is a random variable characterized by a Gamma distri-
bution with E[λ] =αβ,V [λ] =αβ2, respectively. Simultaneously solving the two equations
for the two unknowns yields values of: α = 1.0281 failures/year and β = 0.150801. Fig-
ure 20 depicts the resulting Gamma distribution. The above analysis implies that there is
a 90% probability that the repair rate is in the interval [0.108634,0.459933] repairs/hour
or equivalently, that there is a 90% probability that the time to repair is in the interval
[2.17423,117.464], as depicted in Figure 21.
7.2 Comparison
Figure 22 depicts the probability of the event Tdelta = TR− (TG+TB) and the results are
summarized in Table 4. As noted previously, the Pr{Tdelta > 0}is the probability that,
under the assumptions in this analysis, the telecommunications facility is without power;
the generators and batteries will either fail or be exhausted before utility power is restored.
From the analysis, there is approximately an 8% chance the facility will be without power
and a 7% chance that it will be without power for 10 hours or less. Conversations with
engineers at Sprint have confirmed that, given the scenario, these results are reasonable.
(For convenience, the specific values from Figure 22 are presented in Table 5.)
Table 4. Base Case Time to Failure Summary (w/Utility Repair)
Time to Failure µ σ 10.00% median 90.00%
Base Case Total Tbase = TU +TG+TB 1130 1119 178.8 776.9 2531
Utility Time to Failure - TU 1058 1120 107 706.2 2457
Generator Failure to Start 0.02414 0.04833 2.03E-06 0.00343 0.07514
Diesel Generator - TG 69.57 10.04 72 72 72
Battery (time) - TB 2.625 0.9331 1.294 2.869 3.53
Utility Time to Restore TR 106.2 15300 0.7199 6.409 56.08
Tdelta 35.49 12970 -73.99 -67.1 -9.985
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Table 5. Frequency Table of Tdelta = TR− (TG+TB)
Tdelta Frequency Cumulative %
-80 0 .00%
-75 10137 2.03%
-70 182653 38.56%
-65 87289 56.02%
-60 46811 65.38%
-55 29781 71.33%
-50 20760 75.49%
-45 15691 78.62%
-40 12500 81.12%
-35 10333 83.19%
-30 8900 84.97%
-25 7611 86.49%
-20 6491 87.79%
-15 5831 88.96%
-10 5075 89.97%
-5 4468 90.87%
0 3856 91.64%
5 3207 92.28%
10 2567 92.79%
15 2245 93.24%
20 1917 93.62%
25 1681 93.96%
30 1522 94.27%
35 1333 94.53%
40 1258 94.78%
45 1112 95.01%
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8 Distributed Energy Resources
The following sections discuss the analysis of two alternatives to traditional utility power.
These alternatives are based on the use of natural gas turbines to provide generation of
power immediately at the telecommunications facility. Two configurations of interest to
Sprint were a single Kawasaki turbine and an arrangement of four pallets, each with six
Capstone natural gas microturbines. Both of these configurations depend on a supply of
natural gas; therefore, the reliable supply of the natural gas is critical. The immediate
section addresses the supply of natural gas and the following sections document research
into the two turbine configurations.
Effectively analysis of the operational scenario proposed by Sprint involves relying on
the turbine as the primary facility power source and the use of the Base Case configuration
as the backup power supply. This is depicted in Figure 23.
TU
0
TG
TB
Utility w/o Repair
DER Case
2/3
Fuel
Available
Gen
Start
TTurbine+NG
Figure 23. Time Line for DER Analyses
8.1 Natural Gas Pipeline Reliability
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), within the U. S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), has overall regulatory respon-
sibility for hazardous liquid and gas pipelines under its jurisdiction in the United States.
Federal safety standards are described in U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 49
Transportation, Parts 190 - 199 [19]. There are over 2 million miles of pipelines that sup-
port the movement of hazardous liquids, natural gas and propane. The two types of natural
gas pipelines are transmission and distribution. Transmission lines typically involve the
transportation of natural gas between a storage facility or between a distribution center and
a large volume customer. There are approximately 305,000 miles of transmission pipeline
in the US. In general, pipelines that are not transmission related are distribution pipelines.
Distribution lines branch from transmission lines and supply natural gas to consumers. The
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focus of this effort involves the 1,860,000 miles of pipeline involved with distribution of
natural gas.
There are a number of failure modes for pipelines, most of which are unique to the area
where the pipeline is located and include corrosion, external forces (such as excavation
or natural forces), and material failure among many other factors. To characterize the
probability of failure of a particular distribution line can be extremely complicated. For
example, failure due to corrosion is dependent on such factors as the type and condition of
the pipes coating, the effectiveness of corrosion control equipment, and the soil conditions
surrounding the pipe. Alternatively, the probability of pipeline damage as the result of third
party damage depends on, for example, the extent and type of excavation or agricultural
activity along the pipeline right-of-way and the depth of cover over the pipeline.
The natural gas provider in Orlando has indicated that they will furnish and install the
pipeline some 4 miles (6.437 km) away. A typical feeder line for a natural gas turbine (e.g.
a 1.5 mW Kawasaki turbine site in San Luis Obispo, CA) has a 4” (101.6 mm) feeder
with cutoff connected into an on-site turbine compressor station. A 4” (101.6 mm) pipe is
connected into the turbine from the pump station.
Historically, the dominant failure mode for natural gas distribution pipe line is a result
of external factors involving third-parties, e.g. excavation. The rate at which these failures
occur are a function of the buried depth, how well the pipeline is marked, the density of the
population and the land use of the area of interest. The factors can be used to augment the
basic failure rate established for pipes of a particular diameter [17].
Contribution of external factors to the failure rate of the pipeline:
λExt = λdKdcKwtKpdKpm
where λd is the basic failure rate for pipes of diameter d, and the correction factors Kdc, Kwt ,
Kpd, and Kpm account for failure due to third-party activities: buried depth, wall thickness,
population density and prevention method. Assuming a distribution pipe diameter of 102
mm, an estimate of the basic failure rate is λd = 0.218 failures/ 1000 km-year (Table 2,
[17]) .
It is assumed that for the facility in question that the area is rural Kpd = 0.81 and best
protection method is employed and the length of pipe is 6.44 km. Estimates of the failure
rates are from [20], and [17]. Specifically, the following assumptions are made in the
analysis:
Kdc - worst case is to assume depth of cover is less than 0.91 m: Kdc = 2.54, best case is
to assume that depth of cover is greater than 1.22 m: Kdc = 0.54.
Kwt - worst case is to presume that the wall thickness of pipe will be no more than the
minimum of 4.8 mm: Kwt = 1.0 and best case assumes that the thickness is greater
than 4.8 mm: Kwt = 0.2.
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Kpd - the location of the telecommunication center appears to be rather remote (7 miles
of dirt road). Assume that the area is rural (best case): Kpd = 0.81 and the worst
case assumption is that the distribution pipe is laid through a densely populated area:
Kpd = 18.77.
Kpm - worst case situation implies that there are only marker posts to delineate the location
of the distribution line: Kpm = 1.03 while for best case additional methods are used:
Kpm = 0.91.
Best Case (failures/year):
λb =λdKdcKwtKpdKpm ∗d
=(0.000218)(0.54)(0.2)(0.81)(0.91)(6.44)
=0.000112
Worst Case (failures/year):
λb =λdKdcKwtKpdKpm ∗d
=(0.000218)(2.54)(1.0)(18.77)(1.03)(6.44)
=0.06894
The probability of failure in one year is then assumed to be in the range: Fng = {1−
exp[−0.000112] = 0.000012,1− exp[−0.06894] = 0.06662}. The failure rate of pipeline
is assumed to be a random variable characterized by a lognormal distribution with a 5%
lower limit of 0.000112 and an upper 95% limit of 0.06894.
f (λ|µ,τ) =
√
τ
2piλ2
exp
[
−τ
2
(logλ−µ)2
]
, λ> 0 (2)
Solving for µ and τ given the upper and lower bounds yields values of µ=−5.88577 and
τ = 0.262366. Figure 24 depicts the final distribution for the time to failure of the natural
gas pipeline. As with other elements in the system, the time to failure for the pipeline is
assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable: TNG ∼ exp[−λNGt], where
λNG represents the rate at which pipeline failures occur.
8.2 Capstone Microturbine Analysis
The Capstone microturbines were suggested by Sprint as one possible alternative power
generation source. Emissions are low: approximately 2.3 ppmvd NOx per generator for
75% loading and about 2.0 ppmvd NOx for 100% loading (parts per million on dry volume
basis).
Figure 25 shows six C60 microturbines being used to provide prime power and heat at
the Guisborough Hall luxury hotel in the UK (photo courtesy of Capstone).
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Figure 25. Six Capstone C60 Turbines at Guisborough Hall, UK
The current planned configuration of Capstone turbines consists of four pallets of six
turbines for a total of 24 turbines. Each turbine is capable of 60 kW of output and for
efficiency purposes the turbines are exercised at 90% of their capacity. The total available
power is then 1.296 mW. The current maximum demand is approximately 1.1 mW, leaving
an excess capacity of 196 kW. At the peak level of loading, only 21 of the 24 Capstone
turbines are needed to supply power for MSB-1, MSB-2 and the Earth Station combined.
Sprint suggested that the facility could be supported at a minimum level if even seven of
the microturbines were unavailable.
According to Capstone engineers, these turbines are currently in-place at a variety of
locations and have attained 95% availability. The overall design life is 40,000 hours and
Capstone engineers have estimated the mean time to failure to be 8000 hours and noted
that they expect this to double over the next few years. There are scheduled maintenance
activities at 8,000 and 20,000 hours. The 8,000 maintenance is to change air and some
other filters and replacing the igniter. The downtime for this service is 3 hours. The 20,000
hour service includes the 8,000 hour actions plus changing of fuel injectors. The downtime
for this service is 12 hours.
To characterize the uncertainty in the failure rate for a single Capstone microturbine,
it was assumed that there was a 20% chance that the failure rate would be greater than
λ= 1/8000. Further, it was assumed that there was an 90% probability that the failure rate
51
would be less than λ= 1/16000. (The relatively large value of 20% was due to the lack of
field data to support the 1/8000 estimate.)
Finally, assuming an underlying lognormal distribution for the turbine failure rate and
solving for µ and τ yields values of µ=−9.40558 and τ= 9.38253. The time to failure for
a single Capstone turbine is assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable:
TC1 ∼ exp[−λC1t], where λC1 represents the rate at which turbine failures occur. Figure 26
depicts the resulting distribution for the time to failure for a single Capstone turbine.
Since there is excess capacity with the Capstone package of turbines, the system can be
operated in two modes: cold standby or hot standby. In cold standby, the excess turbines are
not operated and are started only in the event of a failure of one of the primary generators.
In hot standby, all 24 turbines are operated continuously, but each at a lower load level. In
either case, the minimum number of turbines operating at full capacity defines the point at
which the DER system can successfully provide power to the facility.
One configuration suggested by Sandia consisted of running the 21 turbines with the
full available load and the cycling through the remaining three turbines during peak load.
In this case the three turbines are available in ’cold standby’. In this configuration, the
turbines are running at approximately 87% of their capacity for a net efficiency of about
28%. While this configuration was not fully investigated, the overall reliability of the
Capstone system would increase (relative to the following discussion). However, issues
associated with failure at turbine start-up from cold-standby would need to be considered
and may offset the gain in reliability.
An alternative configuration suggested by Sprint involved running the full bank of
twenty-four turbines to support the available load. The drawback of this approach is a small
drop in turbine efficiency. In this configuration, the turbines are running at approximately
76% of their capacity for a net efficiency of approximately 27.5%. The final configuration
proposed by Sprint and addressed in the following discussion, involves running all 24 tur-
bines until seven turbines fail. It was felt by Sprint engineers that this was a more likely
scenario and that the seven failures would reflect a worst case operational configuration.
Figure 27 depicts the results for the analysis assuming the failure of seven turbines or
the loss of the supply of natural gas. The median time to failure for the seventh turbine is
perhaps a bit surprising at 3800 hours, considerably less than the 8300 hour median time to
failure for an individual Capstone turbine. This is an artifact of running all 24 Capstones
simultaneously with no repair. As depicted in Figure 23, assume that the Capstone mi-
croturbines as the primary power source for the facility and the current system, (i.e. Base
Case) is used as a backup power source. Figure 28 summarizes the probability distribution
of the time to failure for the Capstone configuration. Finally, another reliability issue re-
lates to the physical configuration of four pallets of six turbines. Depending on how the the
power system was configured, it is possible that a single failure of the power distribution
system might result in an entire pallet of six (operational) turbines being off-line. The out-
come would be configuration that was a single point of failure for the entire facility. The
likelihood of these events is very low, but requires attention during design.
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8.3 Kawasaki Turbine
A second power system configuration involves the use of a single Kawasaki natural gas
turbine. A typical turbine for this application is the GPB 15X 1.5 mW turbine (Figure 29).
With the addition of an combustion/catalyst system the emissions of the Kawasaki turbine
are low: approximately 3 ppmvd (parts per million on dry volume basis) NOx (15% O2)
over a broad range of power. Kawasaki has provided an MTTF = 200,974 hours and an
Figure 29. Kawasaki Turbine
MTTR = 3.1 hours, based on a sample of 150 installed units. The pictures in Figure 30
are from the Kawasaki GPB brouchure [18]. To characterize the uncertainty in the failure
rate for a Kawasaki turbine, it is assumed that there was a 10% chance that the failure
rate would be greater than λK = 1/200974. Since this number is exceptionally high, to be
conservative, it is assumed that the median failure rate was twice as bad as that reported by
Kawasaki. This implies that there is a 50% chance that the failure rate might be as high as
2×λK .
As with the Capstone mircroturbine, the failure rate is assumed to be a random vari-
able characterized with a lognormal distribution. Solving for µ and τ yields values of
µ = −11.5.178 and τ = 3.41839. The time to failure for a single Kawasaki turbine is
assumed to be an exponentially distributed random variable: TK ∼ exp[−λKt], where λK
represents the rate at which turbine failures occur. Given the estimated values for µ and τ,
Figure 31 depicts the resulting distribution for the time to failure for a Kawasaki turbine.
Note that, while the lower bound on the uncertainty interval is very high, there is substan-
tial uncertainty in the time to failure. This is an artifact of the assumption that there may be
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Figure 30. Kawasaki Footprint
considerable uncertainty assumed in the failure rate estimate provided by Kawasaki. The
assumptions used in characterizing the failure rate ’pulled’ the time to failure distribution
in Figure 32 to the left while allowing for the possibility that the estimates of the failure
rate provided by Kawasaki may be reasonable. One perspective on this result is that there
is a high probability that the Kawasaki turbine will result in a much higher reliability.
As depicted in Figure 23, assume that the Kawasaki turbine acts as the primary power
source for the facility and the current system, (i.e. Base Case) is used as a backup power
source. The time to failure for a facility depending on a single Kawasaki natural gas turbine
as the power source is summarized in Figure 32.
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9 Conclusion
Figure 33 summarizes the results of the three analyses: Base Case, Capstone microturbine
array, and the single Kawasaki turbine. The overlay provides the capability to make a
risk-based decision of the relative reliability benefits of the the three alternatives through a
comparison of the credibility limits for each alternative. Table 6 provides a summary of all
previous related analysis.
Table 6. Analysis Summary
Time to Failure µ σ 10.00% median 90.00%
Capstone TTF TFC 5419 2514 2698 4960 8706
Kawasaki TTF TFK 1.04E+05 137200 7969 59010 249100
Base Case Total Tbase 1130 1119 178.8 776.9 2531
Utility Time to Failure - TU 1058 1120 107 706.2 2457
Generator Failure to Start 0.02414 0.04833 2.03E-06 0.00343 0.07514
Diesel Generator - TG 69.57 10.04 72 72 72
Battery (time) - TB 2.625 0.9331 1.294 2.869 3.53
Since there is no overlap between the credibility limits a comparison is relatively straight-
forward. Consider a comparison between the reliability of the current power supply (i.e.
Base Case) and the array configuration of Capstone microturbines suggested by Sprint.
There is a 90% chance that the utility power will fail before 2457 hours, while there is a
90% chance that the Capstone array will provide power for at least 2698 hours.
Finally, consider that there is a 90% probability that the Capstone array will fail to
provide power for less than approximately 8706 hours, while there is a 90% probability
that the single Kawasaki turbine will provide power for at least 7969 hours.
A significant, but not decisive element in the lower reliability estimate for the Capstone
was the configuration and operational plan suggested by Sprint. Other configurations could
have quite different reliability characteristics and may warrant further investigation. How-
ever, there are installation issues associated with the Capstone, e.g. special enclosure, that
could be a factor in the final decision.
Not considered in the analysis for either the Kawasaki or Capstone configurations is the
probability that the turbines will fail to start when called. Just as with the diesel generators,
there is a likelihood that if the Capstone turbines are left in cold-standby, they will fail to
start. Clearly, this is less of a consideration of the Kawasaki turbine since this turbine is on
24/7. Also, not considered in the analyses is consideration for the differences in the control
systems for the two turbines.
In conclusion, even given the uncertainties in the three alternatives, the clear choice
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is the use of the Kawasaki 1.5 mW turbine as the primary power source for the Sprint
telecommunication facility.
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A Original Fault Trees
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B Base Case.v7 - WinBugs Code
Analysis based on using WinBugs 1.4, 100000 burn-in followed by an additional 500000
samples.
model{
fstart1˜dbeta(af,bf)
fstart2˜dbeta(af,bf)
fstart3˜dbeta(af,bf)
e1˜ dbern(fstart1)
e2˜ dbern(fstart2)
e3˜ dbern(fstart3)
# ei=1 (if generator fails to start) with probability fstarti
# we need to be careful to keep the time units the same
# LambdaG is in units of years
tfG1˜dexp(LambdaG)I(0,fueltime)
tfG2˜dexp(LambdaG)I(0,fueltime)
tfG3˜dexp(LambdaG)I(0,fueltime)
tg1<-(1-e1)*tfG1*hours
tg2<-(1-e2)*tfG2*hours
tg3<-(1-e3)*tfG3*hours
LambdaG˜dgamma(aG,bG)
tfG<- min(min(tg1, tg2)+tg3, max(tg1,tg2) )
LambdaUu˜dgamma(aUu, bUu)
tyUu˜dexp(LambdaUu)
tfUu<- hours*tyUu
#LambdaUd is already in hours
LambdaUd˜dgamma(aUd, bUd)
tfUd˜dexp(LambdaUd)
fbat˜dbeta(aB,bB)
eb˜ dbern(fbat)
# we will assume that if the battery works, we will get timebat hours of use from the battery
# eb=1-> success eb=0 (failure)
tfB<- eb*timebat
TFdelta<- tfUu + tfUd
TF<- tfUu + tfG + tfB
Tdelta <- TFdelta - TF
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}
list(af=0.22, bf=8.9, fueltime=0.008219, hours=8760, timebat=3,
aG=0.6667, bG=0.03412,
aUu=19.14, bUu=2.19,
aUd=1.0281, bUd=6.63126,
aB=3.70868, bB=2.78512)
list(fstart1=1, fstart2=1, fstart3=1,LambdaG=1)
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C Capstone.v2- WinBugs Code
Analysis based on using WinBugs 1.4, 100000 burn-in followed by an additional 500000
samples.
model{ # Capstone 7/24 v2.2 lognormal turbine failure rate PDF)
fstart1˜dbeta(af,bf)
fstart2˜dbeta(af,bf)
fstart3˜dbeta(af,bf)
e1˜ dbern(fstart1)
e2˜ dbern(fstart2)
e3˜ dbern(fstart3)
# ei=1 (if generator fails to start) with probability fstarti
# we need to be careful to keep the time units the same
# LambdaG is in units of years
LambdaG˜dgamma(aG,bG)
ttfG1˜dexp(LambdaG)
ttfG2˜dexp(LambdaG)
ttfG3˜dexp(LambdaG)
tfG1<- min(ttfG1, fueltime)
tfG2<- min(ttfG2, fueltime)
tfG3<- min(ttfG3, fueltime)
tg1<-(1-e1)*tfG1*hours
tg2<-(1-e2)*tfG2*hours
tg3<-(1-e3)*tfG3*hours
tfG<- min(min(tg1, tg2)+tg3, max(tg1,tg2) )
# utility up-time
LambdaUu˜dgamma(aUu, bUu)
tyUu˜dexp(LambdaUu)
tfUu<- hours*tyUu
#LambdaUd is already in hours
LambdaUd˜dgamma(aUd, bUd)
tfUd˜dexp(LambdaUd)
#Battery Code
j ˜ dunif(0, 1)
tfb16 <- alpha16[J] + beta16[J]*(j - x.change16[J])
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J <- 1 + step(j - x1.change16) + step(j - x2.change16) + step(j - x3.change16)
k ˜ dunif(0, 1)
tfb28 <- alpha28[K] + beta28[K]*(k - x.change28[K])
K <- 1 + step(k - x1.change28) + step(k - x2.change28) + step(k - x3.change28)
tfB <- min(tfb16, tfb28)
# natural gas
# for the Turbine, two failure modes are possible
# either the natural gas line is cut or the turbine fails
ttfNG˜dexp(LambdaNG)
LambdaNG˜dlnorm(aNG,bNG)
tfNG<-ttfNG*hours
LambdaC˜dlnorm(aC,bC)
#generate failure times for operational turbine
for (i in 1:24) {
tfc[i] ˜dexp(LambdaC)
}
# Capstones are lost when 7th turbine fails
tfCh <- ranked(tfc[],7)
tfC1 <- ranked(tfc[],1)
# power can only last as long as either
# the NG is available or Capstones are operating
tfCap<-min(tfNG, tfCh)
#Tdelta = time without backup (including restoration)
TFdelta<- tfUu + tfUd
Tbase <- tfUu+tfG+tfB
TF<- tfCap + tfUu + tfG + tfB
Tdelta <- TFdelta - (tfUu+tfG+tfB)
}
list(af=0.22, bf=8.9, fueltime=0.008219, hours=8760,
aG=0.6667, bG=0.03412,
aUu=19.14, bUu=2.19,
aUd=1.0281, bUd=6.63126,
aNG=-5.89, bNG=0.26236,
aC= -9.40558, bC=9.38253,
beta16 = c(0, 66.67, 5, 1.333),
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alpha16 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),
x.change16 = c(0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.25),
x1.change16 = 0.02,
x2.change16 = 0.05,
x3.change16 = 0.25,
beta28 = c(0, 40, 3.125, 1.667),
alpha28 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),
x.change28 = c(0, 0.03, 0.08, 0.40),
x1.change28 = 0.03,
x2.change28 = 0.08,
x3.change28 = 0.40)
list(fstart1=1, fstart2=1, fstart3=1,LambdaG=19, LambdaC=1)
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D Kawasaki.v5- WinBugs Code
Analysis based on using WinBugs 1.4, 100000 burn-in followed by an additional 500000
samples.
model{ #Kawasaki v8 (lognormal Kawasaki failure rate PDF)
fstart1˜dbeta(af,bf)
fstart2˜dbeta(af,bf)
fstart3˜dbeta(af,bf)
e1˜ dbern(fstart1)
e2˜ dbern(fstart2)
e3˜ dbern(fstart3)
# ei=1 (if generator fails to start) with probability fstarti
# we need to be careful to keep the time units the same
# LambdaG is in units of years
LambdaG˜dgamma(aG,bG)
ttfG1˜dexp(LambdaG)
ttfG2˜dexp(LambdaG)
ttfG3˜dexp(LambdaG)
tfG1<- min(ttfG1, fueltime)
tfG2<- min(ttfG2, fueltime)
tfG3<- min(ttfG3, fueltime)
tg1<-(1-e1)*tfG1*hours
tg2<-(1-e2)*tfG2*hours
tg3<-(1-e3)*tfG3*hours
tfG<- min(min(tg1, tg2)+tg3, max(tg1,tg2) )
# utility up-time
LambdaUu˜dgamma(aUu, bUu)
tyUu˜dexp(LambdaUu)
tfUu<- hours*tyUu
#LambdaUd is already in hours
LambdaUd˜dgamma(aUd, bUd)
tfUd˜dexp(LambdaUd)
#Battery Code
j ˜ dunif(0, 1)
tfb16 <- alpha16[J] + beta16[J]*(j - x.change16[J])
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J <- 1 + step(j - x1.change16) + step(j - x2.change16) + step(j - x3.change16)
k ˜ dunif(0, 1)
tfb28 <- alpha28[K] + beta28[K]*(k - x.change28[K])
K <- 1 + step(k - x1.change28) + step(k - x2.change28) + step(k - x3.change28)
tfB <- min(tfb16, tfb28)
# natural gas
# for the Turbine, two failure modes are possible
# either the natural gas line is cut or the turbine fails
ttfNG˜dexp(LambdaNG)
LambdaNG˜dlnorm(aNG,bNG)
tfNG<-ttfNG*hours
LambdaK˜dlnorm(aK,bK)
ttfK˜dexp(LambdaK)
tfKh<-ttfK
tfK<-min(tfNG, tfKh)
#Tdelta = time without backup (including restoration)
TFdelta<- tfUu + tfUd
Tbase <- tfUu+tfG+tfB
TF<- tfK + tfUu + tfG + tfB
Tdelta <- TFdelta - Tbase
}
list(af=0.22, bf=8.9, fueltime=0.008219, hours=8760,
aG=0.6667, bG=0.03412,
aUu=19.14, bUu=2.19,
aUd=1.0281, bUd=6.63126,
aNG=-5.89, bNG=0.26236,
aK=-11.5178, bK=3.14839,
beta16 = c(0, 66.67, 5, 1.333),
alpha16 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),
x.change16 = c(0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.25),
x1.change16 = 0.02,
x2.change16 = 0.05,
x3.change16 = 0.25,
beta28 = c(0, 40, 3.125, 1.667),
alpha28 = c(0, 0, 2, 3),
x.change28 = c(0, 0.03, 0.08, 0.40),
x1.change28 = 0.03,
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x2.change28 = 0.08,
x3.change28 = 0.40)
list(fstart1=1, fstart2=1, fstart3=1,LambdaG=19, LambdaK=0.01)
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